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Tax
Nondeductible Alimony
By Edward J. Schnee
November 2002

TAX CASE

Divorce can create a host of personal and financial problems for the parties involved. A misunderstanding about the tax consequences of a settlement agreement can exacerbate these difficulties.

John Lovejoy instituted divorce proceedings against his wife. He made support payments to her while the divorce was pending. These payments were not formally designated as either alimony or child support. Lovejoy deducted the payments on his tax return as alimony. His wife died before the divorce was finalized, and the proceedings were discontinued. The IRS denied the taxpayer’s alimony deduction because the payments failed to meet the requirement that they terminate at death—even though Lovejoy made no payments after his wife’s death. The Tax Court ruled for the IRS and the taxpayer appealed.

Result. For the IRS. To meet the requirement for deductible alimony, payments must fulfill all the conditions in IRC section 215.

The payments are received under a divorce or separation instrument.
The instrument does not designate the payments as something other than alimony.
The payments occur when the taxpayers are not members of the same household.
The payments will terminate at death.

The IRS conceded the taxpayer had met the first and third conditions. It also acknowledged that, under federal law, payments will be treated as alimony unless specifically designated as “nonalimony.” The IRS also agreed that in Colorado, where Lovejoy resided, the law says alimony stops at death, and state law usually is sufficient to meet the termination-at-death requirement. However, it disagreed that Colorado would treat the payments in question as alimony. It argued that, under Colorado law, an unlabeled payment that replaces both alimony and child support would be treated at least in part as child support, which continues even after the payor’s death. Therefore the undesignated payment does not terminate at death. The fact there were no postmortem payments was immaterial. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this analysis and denied the deduction.

Although federal law makes provisions for classifying undesignated payments and determining termination rules under state law, it always is risky for taxpayers to depend on a federal interpretation of state law and its application to federal tax rules. If the separation agreement had either designated the payments as alimony or specifically provided for their termination upon the spouse’s death, the taxpayer would have been entitled to the deduction. A well-drafted agreement will cover all aspects of a divorce, including the taxation of any payments or transfers.

John H. Lovejoy v. Commissioner, CA-10, 6/02.

Prepared by Edward J. Schnee, CPA, PhD, Joe Lane Professor of Accounting and director, MTA program, Culverhouse School of Accountancy, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa.


Tax
Tax Notes
November 2002
The IRS proposes regulations ( www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/fedreg/a020802c.html ) requiring certain financial institutions to report interest payments made to nonresident aliens who reside in specified countries and maintain deposits in the U.S. offices of such entities. Currently the service mandates reporting of this interest only if a financial institution pays it to a U.S. person or to a nonresident alien residing in Canada. The IRS withdrew an earlier proposal with broader applications.

The IRS publishes final regulations involving amendments to Circular 230 ( www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb02-33.pdf ), which governs the practice of CPAs and others before the service. Among the issues these rules cover are submitting taxpayer records to the IRS; handling a client’s act of noncompliance, error or omission; contingent fees; returning a client’s records; advertising and solicitations; and IRS disciplinary proceedings.

In August the IRS issued final regulations ( www.irs.gov/pub/irs-regs/td9013.pdf ) pertaining to treatment of self-charged items of income and expense under IRC section 469. The changes recharacterize a percentage of certain portfolio income and expense as passive income and expense (that is, self-charged items) when a taxpayer engages in a lending transaction with a partnership or an S corporation (that is, a pass-through entity) in which the taxpayer owns an interest and the loan proceeds are used in a passive activity.

The IRS gives tax professionals early notice of where their clients’ 2002 tax returns should be filed in 2003. To improve customer service, it redistributed tax-return workloads among its 10 regional processing centers. It published ( www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-02-92.pdf ) the location of the processing center for each geographic area.

For single-click access to further coverage of the news stories listed here, visit the Journal of Accountancy Web site at www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/joahome.htm .


Tax
Special Report: The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance
By Ronald R. Hiner and Darlene Pulliam Smith
November 2002

Constitutionality became a much discussed issue when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided reciting the Pledge of Allegiance in a public school was unconstitutional. In a less publicized opinion, the Ninth Circuit also questioned the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance, which provides a tax break to ministers. In Richard D. Warren, 282 F3d 1119, the appeals court reviewed a Tax Court decision allowing Warren, a minister, and his wife to exclude up to $80,000 of parsonage allowance.

The appeals court requested a brief from law professor Erwin Chemerinsky on the constitutionality question. Later, after Congress amended IRC section 107 to limit the allowance to the fair rental value of the parsonage, the Warrens and the IRS agreed to dismiss the case. However, Professor Chemerinsky then filed a motion to intervene, challenging the constitutionality of section 107 as amended. On August 26, 2002, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in the Warren case. Since the parties already had agreed to dismiss the suit, the only issue was Chemerinsky’s motion. The court denied it.

The parsonage allowance
Section 107 allows a “minister of the gospel” to exclude from income the rental value—including utilities—of a home the church furnishes as part of his or her compensation or the rental allowance it pays under the same circumstances to the extent the minister uses the allowance to rent or provide a home. Under Treasury regulations section 1.107-1(a), the home or rental allowance the religious organization provides must be as payment for services that ordinarily are the duties of a minister of the gospel. Treasury regulations section 1.1402(c)-5(b)(2) defines the services ministers perform as “sacerdotal functions,” the conducting of religious worship and the control, conduct and maintenance of religious organizations (including religious boards, societies and other integral agencies of such organizations), under the authority of a religious body.

The Warren case
Richard Warren, a Baptist minister in California, founded the Saddleback Valley Community Church in 1980. It was successful and grew to 18,000 members by 1992. Warren also derived substantial income as an author and from a tape and book ministry. He and his wife owned a residence that cost $360,000 in 1992. In the three years in question, the home’s fair rental value was $58,061, $58,004 and $59,479. The church trustees allocated $42,496, $85,000 and $80,000, respectively, as the Warrens’ housing allowance. The allocated amounts were 80% to 100% of the compensation the church paid Warren. The Warrens spent $77,663, $76,309 and $84,278 to provide a home for themselves by paying for mortgage, utilities, furnishings, landscaping, repairs, maintenance, real property taxes and homeowner’s insurance. The Warrens excluded those amounts from income to the extent the church allocated and paid them.

The dispute between the Warrens and the IRS centered on the difference between how much the couple spent on housing and the home’s fair rental value. The IRS disallowed the housing allowance exclusion for amounts they spent in excess of the fair rental value. However, the Tax Court held that the Warrens could exclude the full amount. The court carefully evaluated the wording and history of section 107, concluding that it did not limit the exclusion. The IRS appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

The Ninth Circuit did not immediately reach a conclusion. It appointed an amicus curiae (Latin for “friend of the court”) and asked for supplemental briefs. Rather than decide on the Tax Court’s interpretation of section 107, Judge Browning and Judge Reinhardt chose to question the provision’s constitutionality. Judge Tallman wrote a strong dissent. Browning and Reinhardt questioned whether the government should provide a subsidy to religious organizations that the free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution does not require. Quoting the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Texas Monthly, 109 US 890 (1989), the judges considered the possibility such a subsidy would provide unjustifiable assistance to religious organizations at the expense of nonreligious ones.

The amicus curiae brief
The Ninth Circuit appointed Professor Chemerinsky, of the University of Southern California Law School, to serve as amicus curiae. In his brief (Ninth Circuit document 2002-11315), he argued strongly that, under controlling Supreme Court precedents, the parsonage allowance clearly violated the Constitution’s establishment clause (see box ) and was unconstitutional. In reaching this conclusion Chemerinsky relied primarily on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971).

Chemerinsky argued that the purpose of the exemption was to advance religion. Because the provision applied only to “ministers of the gospel,” it didn’t appear to have a secular legislative purpose because only clergy had the advantage of being paid—at least in part—with tax-free dollars.

The professor also argued the parsonage allowance fostered excessive government entanglement with religion as government representatives must set standards and eventually decide who is a minister of the gospel, requiring the representatives to look closely into a religious entity’s organization and activities.

Church and Justice Department briefs
Representatives of a group of church-related organizations (Ninth Circuit document 2002-10836) and the Department of Justice (Ninth Circuit document 2002-11969) also submitted briefs. Their arguments were quite similar.

Both said the Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to question section 107’s constitutionality. But if the court did, in fact, have such jurisdiction, both parties argued section 107 was constitutional. They said Chemerinsky’s arguments were not valid because he took a very narrow view. The parsonage allowance is one of many provisions that allow employees to enjoy employer-provided housing tax-free. If all were analyzed together, it would be clear that no particular group gets preferential treatment and thus there is no constitutionality question.

The Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act
In response to the Ninth Circuit’s actions, Congress passed the Clergy Housing Allowance Clarification Act of 2002. President Bush signed it into law on May 20. One of the purported purposes of the new law was to support the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance.

The parsonage allowance now is limited to the fair rental value of a minister’s home. This provision is effective for tax years beginning after 2001. Under new section 107(b)(2), if the taxpayer filed a return before April 17, 2002, and limited the exclusion to the fair rental value of the home, or filed the return after April 16, 2002, the new limitation applied.

New section 107(b)(3) says: “Except as provided in paragraph (2), notwithstanding any prior regulation, revenue ruling or other guidance issued by the Internal Revenue Service, no person shall be subject to the limitations added to section 107…for any taxable year beginning before January 1, 2002.” This provision would likely have dictated the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion as to how much Warren could exclude for his parsonage allowance. Since the years in question were before 2001, Warren would not have been limited to the fair rental value of his home for those years.

The status of the parsonage allowance
With this case closed, there is no immediate challenge to the constitutionality of the parsonage allowance. If he wishes, Professor Chemerinsky can file a motion in his district court to challenge this presumption and proceed through the court system. Taxpayers claiming the parsonage allowance now must be ready to document the fair rental value of their homes. Any costs related to preparing this documentation would be a miscellaneous itemized deduction under IRC section 212 as an expense related to determining income tax.

—Ronald R. Hiner, CPA, EdD, professor of accounting, and Darlene Pulliam Smith, CPA, PhD, professor of accounting, both at T. Boone Pickens College of Business, West Texas A&M University, Canyon.

The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause is in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It reads in part: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof….”

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